Designing water symbiosis networks in an industrial site is aimed to solve the water quality and security problem by minimising freshwater consumption or pollutant discharge. However, implementing the symbiosis requires an expensive capital cost on the site and may need cost compensation by the authority to facilitate the operation. This work aims to identify the distribution of stable and fair profits to the plants from the government to each stakeholder with the Cooperative Game approach. This study considers the grand coalition of finite players (industrial plants/stakeholders) with authority to facilitate water recycling in an eco-industrial park. The first stage includes the determination of the park authority's objectives (i.e., to minimise cost, resource usage, or pollutants discharge) if the stakeholders cooperate. In the next stage, the park authority can then compensate the cost by providing incentives or subsidies for the stakeholders that participate in the symbiosis. The incentives can be a rewarding scheme for the recycling efforts, while the subsidies are the money required to build the facilities. The stakeholders are then allowed to decide the recycling amount that maximises their economic interests. A wastewater tax can be imposed by the authority to the stakeholders to stimulate them to take part in the symbiosis while generating the money source for subsidisation. Proper game analysis is provided to analyze the Nash Equilibrium solutions of the tax rate. A hypothetical case study is used to demonstrate how fair subsidisation can be identified and the implementation of taxation policy. The proposed framework demonstrates the potential benefits and guidelines for each industrial plant, as well as the government, to derive a feasible cooperative policy to achieve the goal of environmental emissions reduction and can be applied to analyze similar symbiosis.

在工业现场设计水共生网络旨在通过最大限度地减少淡水消耗或污染物排放来解决水质和安全问题。但是，实施共生需要在现场进行昂贵的资本成本，并且可能需要当局进行成本补偿以促进运营。这项工作旨在通过合作博弈方法确定从政府到每个利益相关者对工厂的稳定和公平的利润分配。本研究考虑了有限参与者（工业工厂/利益相关者）的大联盟，他们有权促进生态工业园区中的水回收。如果利益相关者合作，第一阶段包括确定公园管理部门的目标（即最小化成本、资源使用或污染物排放）。在下一阶段，然后，公园管理局可以通过为参与共生的利益相关者提供奖励或补贴来补偿成本。奖励可以是回收工作的奖励计划，而补贴是建造设施所需的资金。然后允许利益相关者决定最大化其经济利益的回收量。当局可以向利益相关者征收废水税，以刺激他们参与共生，同时产生补贴的资金来源。提供适当的博弈分析来分析税率的纳什均衡解。假设案例研究用于展示如何确定公平补贴和税收政策的实施。