In this letter, we propose three schemes designed to detect attacks over the air interface in cellular networks. These decision rules rely on the generalized likelihood ratio test, and are fed by data that can be acquired using common off-the-shelf receivers. In addition to more classical (barrage/smart) noise jamming attacks, we further assess the capability of the proposed schemes to detect the stealthy activation of a rogue base station. The evaluation is carried out through an experimentation of a LTE system concretely reproduced using Software-Defined Radios. Illustrative examples confirm that the proposed schemes can effectively detect air interface threats with high probability.

中文翻译：

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恶劣场景下空口攻击检测方案设计与实验评估


在这封信中，我们提出了三种旨在检测蜂窝网络中空中接口攻击的方案。这些决策规则依赖于广义似然比测试，并由可以使用常见的现成接收器获取的数据提供。除了更经典的（弹幕/智能）噪声干扰攻击之外，我们还进一步评估了所提出的方案检测恶意基站隐秘激活的能力。该评估是通过使用软件定义无线电具体再现的 LTE 系统的实验来进行的。示例证实所提出的方案能够以高概率有效地检测空中接口威胁。