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Optimal Mechanism Design in the Sponsored Content Service Market
IEEE Communications Letters ( IF 4.1 ) Pub Date : 2021-06-29 , DOI: 10.1109/lcomm.2021.3093501
Mina Montazeri , Hamed Kebriaei , Babak N. Araabi , Dusit Niyato

We adopt contract theory to design a mechanism for interaction between the content provider (CP) and mobile users (MUs) with asymmetric information. To incentivize MUs to consume more content, a content scheme is proposed in which the CP provides some financial assistance to MUs. This scheme yields both the MUs and CP benefit due to gained utility and advertisement revenue in response to high data usage, respectively. We prove that a unique functional strategy exists to allocate the content demand and financial assistance based on MUs’ types. This strategy satisfies the incentive compatibility, individual rationality and maximizes the CP’s profit.

中文翻译:

赞助内容服务市场的优化机制设计

我们采用契约理论设计了一种信息不对称的内容提供者(CP)和移动用户(MU)之间的交互机制。为了激励 MU 消费更多内容,提出了一种内容方案,其中 CP 向 MU 提供一些经济援助。由于响应于高数据使用而获得的效用和广告收入,该方案分别产生了 MU 和 CP 的好处。我们证明存在一种独特的功能策略来根据 MU 的类型分配内容需求和财务援助。该策略满足激励相容、个体理性和CP利润最大化。
更新日期:2021-06-29
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