Although the resource curse offers evidence for the national crowding out generated by resource windfalls from mining, subnational crowding is not fully understood. This knowledge gap is problematic because these windfalls should cover the negative externalities that exist in host zones. Additionally, these communities have different fiscal responsibilities due to the mining industry's environmental, economic, and social costs. This article estimates the subnational crowd out of mining windfalls on local tax collection by considering different levels of fiscal responsibility. We employ panel data for 322 Chilean municipalities between 2008 and 2019 using an exogenous rule for assigning mining windfalls in order to attribute causality. Our results confirm the crowding out hypothesis. First, a US$1.0 increase in mining windfalls results in a US$0.2 decrease in the property tax collected. Second, subnational crowding out is twice as high in municipalities with a high level of fiscal responsibility; a US$1.0 increase in windfalls crowds out US$0.4 in non-resource revenue. Third, considering the influence of nearby neighborhoods and the spatial interdependence, crowding out is four times higher than non-spatial estimations. These results call for local policies that consider the fiscal capacity of a municipality in order to disincentivize undesirable behavior from extra resource revenues.

尽管资源诅咒为采矿带来的意外资源所产生的国家挤出提供了证据，但尚未完全了解次国家挤出。这种知识差距是有问题的，因为这些意外收获应该涵盖东道地区存在的负面外部性。此外，由于采矿业的环境、经济和社会成本，这些社区承担不同的财政责任。本文通过考虑不同级别的财政责任来估计地方税收中从采矿意外中获得的地方人群。我们使用了 2008 年至 2019 年间智利 322 个城市的面板数据，使用外生规则分配采矿意外收获，以归因于因果关系。我们的结果证实了挤出假设。首先，1美元。采矿意外收入增加 0 导致征收的财产税减少 0.2 美元。其次，在财政责任水平较高的城市，次国家级挤出率高出两倍；意外收入增加 1.0 美元会挤出 0.4 美元的非资源收入。第三，考虑到附近邻域的影响和空间相互依存性，挤出比非空间估计高四倍。这些结果要求地方政策考虑市政当局的财政能力，以抑制来自额外资源收入的不良行为。考虑到附近邻域的影响和空间相互依赖性，挤出比非空间估计高四倍。这些结果要求地方政策考虑市政当局的财政能力，以抑制来自额外资源收入的不良行为。考虑到附近邻域的影响和空间相互依赖性，挤出比非空间估计高四倍。这些结果要求地方政策考虑市政当局的财政能力，以抑制来自额外资源收入的不良行为。