We explore the optimal shape of the income tax and transfer schedule in an environment with distinct roles for public and private insurance. In a calibration to the United States, we find that the optimal system features marginal tax rates that increase in income. When we increase pressure on the government to raise revenue, the optimal marginal tax schedule becomes first flatter and then U-shaped, reconciling various findings in the literature. A power function parametric tax schedule outperforms an affine one, indicating that tax progressivity is more important than lump-sum transfers. We also explore various social welfare objectives and Pareto-improving reforms.

中文翻译：

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最佳所得税：Mirrlees 遇见 Ramsey

我们探索了在公共和私人保险角色不同的环境中所得税和转移时间表的最佳形式。在对美国的校准中，我们发现最优系统的特征是收入增加的边际税率。当我们增加政府增加收入的压力时，最优边际税收计划首先变得平坦，然后变成 U 形，这与文献中的各种发现一致。幂函数参数税表优于仿射表，表明税收累进比一次性转移更重要。我们还探索各种社会福利目标和帕累托改进改革。