This paper investigates to what extent laboratory measures of cheating generalise to the field. To this purpose, we develop a lab measure that allows for individual-level observations of cheating whilst reducing the likelihood that participants feel observed. Decisions made in this laboratory task are then compared to individual choices taken in the field, where subjects can lie by misreporting their experimental earnings. We use two field variations that differ in the degree of anonymity of the field decision. According to our measure, no correlation of behaviour between the laboratory and the field is found. We then perform the same analysis using a lab measure that can only detect cheating at the aggregate level. In this case, we do find a weak correlation between the two environments. We discuss the significance and interpretation of these results.

本文调查了实验室作弊措施在多大程度上推广到该领域。为此，我们开发了一种实验室措施，允许对作弊进行个人层面的观察，同时降低参与者感到被观察的可能性。然后将在这项实验室任务中做出的决定与在该领域做出的个人选择进行比较，在该领域中，受试者可能会通过误报他们的实验收入来撒谎。我们使用两个字段变量，它们在字段决策的匿名程度方面有所不同。根据我们的测量，没有发现实验室和现场之间的行为相关性。然后，我们使用只能检测总体水平的作弊的实验室测量来执行相同的分析。在这种情况下，我们确实发现两种环境之间存在弱相关性。