A sentence like every circle is blue might be understood in terms of individuals and their properties (e.g., for each thing that is a circle, it is blue) or in terms of a relation between groups (e.g., the blue things include the circles). Relatedly, theorists can specify the contents of universally quantified sentences in first-order or second-order terms. We offer new evidence that this logical first-order vs. second-order distinction corresponds to a psychologically robust individual vs. group distinction that has behavioral repercussions. Participants were shown displays of dots and asked to evaluate sentences with each, every, or all combined with a predicate (e.g., big dot). We find that participants are better at estimating how many things the predicate applied to after evaluating sentences in which universal quantification is indicated with every or all, as opposed to each. We argue that every and all are understood in second-order terms that encourage group representation, while each is understood in first-order terms that encourage individual representation. Since the sentences that participants evaluate are truth-conditionally equivalent, our results also bear on questions concerning how meanings are related to truth-conditions.

像every circle is blue这样的句子可以从个体及其属性的角度来理解（例如，对于每个是圆圈的东西，它都是蓝色的）或根据组之间的关系（例如，蓝色的东西包括圆圈）来理解. 相关地，理论家可以用一阶或二阶术语来指定通用量化句子的内容。我们提供了新的证据，表明这种合乎逻辑的一阶与二阶区别对应于具有行为影响的心理上稳健的个人与群体区别。参与者被展示了点，并要求他们评估每个、每个或全部与谓词（例如，大点）。我们发现，参与者更好地估计多少事谓词应用于评估其全称量化表示与句子之后每隔或全部，而不是每一个。我们认为，每一个和所有在鼓励群表示二阶项被理解，而每次在鼓励个人表示一阶来理解。由于参与者评估的句子在真值条件上是等价的，我们的结果也涉及意义如何与真值条件相关的问题。