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Dovish and Hawkish Influence in Distributive and Integrative Negotiations: The Role of (A)symmetry in Constituencies
Group Decision and Negotiation ( IF 3.6 ) Pub Date : 2021-09-07 , DOI: 10.1007/s10726-021-09759-6
Hillie Aaldering 1 , Shirli Kopelman 2
Affiliation  

Dovish and hawkish constituency pressures influence representative negotiations. Dovish constituency voices promote a collaborative and problem-solving approach, but can also allow for exploitation in negotiations. Hawkish voices encourage a competitive approach, but may leave value on the table. These dynamics are investigated in four experiments. In two interactive dyadic-negotiation experiments (Experiments 1 & 2; N = 186 and N = 220), we investigated how constituency pressures influenced outcomes in two negotiation settings (distributive and integrative). Representatives of dovish constituencies reached higher negotiation outcomes than representatives of hawkish constituencies, when facing a representative with a similar constituency (Experiment 1). However, when representatives with a dovish constituency met with representatives of a hawkish constituency, dovish representatives reached lower gains in both negotiation settings (Experiment 2). This hawkish advantage was replicated in two online scenario studies (Experiments 3 & 4; N = 248 and N = 319). There was no consistent empirical support for the role of a potential future interaction in eliciting representatives’ concessions (Experiment 1–3), however, an absence of accountability to constituents reduced representatives’ competitiveness, irrespective of whom they represented (Experiment 4). Theoretical and practical implications for labor relations, diplomacy, and business negotiations are discussed.



中文翻译:

分配和综合谈判中鸽派和鹰派的影响:(A)对称性在选区中的作用

鸽派和鹰派的选区压力影响代表谈判。鸽派选民的声音促进了协作和解决问题的方法,但也允许在谈判中进行剥削。鹰派的声音鼓励竞争方法,但可能会留下价值。在四个实验中研究了这些动力学。在两个交互式二元协商实验中(实验 1 和 2;N  = 186 和N = 220),我们调查了选区压力如何影响两种谈判环境(分配和整合)中的结果。当面对类似选区的代表时,鸽派选区的代表比鹰派选区的代表取得了更高的谈判结果(实验 1)。然而,当鸽派选区的代表会见鹰派选区的代表时,鸽派代表在两种谈判环境中都取得了较低的收益(实验 2)。这种鹰派优势在两个在线情景研究(实验 3 和 4;N  = 248 和N = 319)。对于潜在的未来互动在引起代表让步方面的作用没有一致的实证支持(实验 1-3),但是,对三方成员缺乏问责会降低代表的竞争力,无论他们代表谁(实验 4)。讨论了劳动关系、外交和商务谈判的理论和实践意义。

更新日期:2021-09-09
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