In Colombia, Law 1787 of 2016 legalized marijuana for medicinal and scientific purposes. The law promotes social inclusion in two ways: (1) establishing mechanisms to incentivize rural marijuana production; and (2) protecting and strengthening small producers in the context of governmental efforts to voluntarily substitute illicit crops. These commitments are consistent with the peace agreement reached in 2016 between the guerrilla group, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP) and the Colombian government, in which a solution to the problem of illicit crops based on voluntary substitution and rural development was proposed. What has happened, however, is that instead of the proposed “inclusion,” the legalization of marijuana has benefited the corporate sector almost exclusively. Employing a southern criminological approach, we first analyze the punitive rationale in the so-called “War on Drugs” and the shift to a purportedly more benign pro-poor and pro-health legalization discourse. From here, we critique the legal architecture to regulate the production of marijuana. In so doing, we illustrate how uneven power relations and governmental capitalist favoritism have been utilized by corporate ventures located in the political and economic bureaucratic heart of Colombia, reproducing the historical marginalization of impoverished mestizo campesinos (peasant farmers), whose livelihoods have been dependent on illicit crops.

在哥伦比亚，2016 年的第 1787 号法律将用于医疗和科学目的的大麻合法化。该法律通过两种方式促进社会包容：(1) 建立激励农村大麻生产的机制；(2) 在政府努力自愿替代非法作物的背景下保护和加强小生产者。这些承诺与 2016 年哥伦比亚革命武装力量——Ejército del Pueblo游击队达成的和平协议一致(FARC-EP) 和哥伦比亚政府，其中提出了基于自愿替代和农村发展的非法作物问题的解决方案。然而，发生的事情是，大麻合法化几乎完全使企业部门受益，而不是提议的“包容”。我们采用南方的犯罪学方法，首先分析了所谓的“毒品战争”中的惩罚性理由，以及向据称更温和的有利于穷人和健康的合法化话语的转变。从这里开始，我们批判了规范大麻生产的法律架构。通过这样做，我们说明了位于哥伦比亚政治和经济官僚中心的企业如何利用不平衡的权力关系和政府资本主义的偏爱，campesinos（农民），他们的生计依赖​​于非法作物。