Abstract

In this study, we assume special district incorporation is the outsourced service from general-purpose governments. Once a special district is created, general-purpose governments have little incentives to provide overlapping services together with special districts in a designated area. Since any failure of management is not shared between politically and financially independent entities, the general-purpose governments externalize some service functions with some contribution to government performance. We test how the costs associated with service production of general-purpose governments affect the incorporation of specific types of special districts. Using negative binomial estimations, we find that services that require the high level of initial investment and have performance qualities that are difficult to evaluate are selectively outsourced.

摘要

在本研究中，我们假设特区注册是来自通用政府的外包服务。一旦创建了特区，通用政府几乎没有动力在指定区域内与特区一起提供重叠服务。由于任何管理失败都不会在政治和财政独立的实体之间分担，通用政府将一些服务功能外部化，对政府绩效做出一些贡献。我们测试了与通用政府服务生产相关的成本如何影响特定类型特区的合并。使用负二项式估计，