In-storage computing with modern solid-state drives (SSDs) enables developers to offload programs from the host to the SSD. It has been proven to be an effective approach to alleviate the I/O bottleneck. To facilitate in-storage computing, many frameworks have been proposed. However, few of them treat the in-storage security as the first citizen. Specifically, since modern SSD controllers do not have a trusted execution environment, an offloaded (malicious) program could steal, modify, and even destroy the data stored in the SSD. In this paper, we first investigate the attacks that could be conducted by offloaded in-storage programs. To defend against these attacks, we build a lightweight trusted execution environment, named IceClave for in-storage computing. IceClave enables security isolation between in-storage programs and flash management functions that include flash address translation, data access control, and garbage collection, with TrustZone extensions. IceClave also achieves security isolation between in-storage programs by enforcing memory integrity verification of in-storage DRAM with low overhead. To protect data loaded from flash chips, IceClave develops a lightweight data encryption/decryption mechanism in flash controllers. We develop IceClave with a full system simulator. We evaluate IceClave with a variety of data-intensive applications such as databases. Compared to state-of-the-art in-storage computing approaches, IceClave introduces only 7.6% performance overhead, while enforcing security isolation in the SSD controller with minimal hardware cost. IceClave still keeps the performance benefit of in-storage computing by delivering up to 2.31$\times$ better performance than the conventional host-based trusted computing approach.

中文翻译：

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IceClave：用于存储计算的可信执行环境

使用现代固态驱动器 (SSD) 的存储计算使开发人员能够将程序从主机卸载到 SSD。它已被证明是缓解 I/O 瓶颈的有效方法。为了促进存储计算，已经提出了许多框架。然而，很少有人将存储安全视为第一公民。具体来说，由于现代 SSD 控制器没有可信的执行环境，卸载（恶意）程序可能会窃取、修改甚至破坏存储在 SSD 中的数据。在本文中，我们首先调查卸载的存储程序可能进行的攻击。为了抵御这些攻击，我们构建了一个轻量级的可信执行环境，名为 IceClave，用于存储计算。IceClave 通过 TrustZone 扩展实现了存储程序和闪存管理功能（包括闪存地址转换、数据访问控制和垃圾收集）之间的安全隔离。IceClave 还通过以低开销强制执行存储 DRAM 的内存完整性验证，实现了存储程序之间的安全隔离。为了保护从闪存芯片加载的数据，IceClave 在闪存控制器中开发了一种轻量级的数据加密/解密机制。我们使用完整的系统模拟器开发 IceClave。我们使用各种数据密集型应用程序（例如数据库）评估 IceClave。与最先进的存储计算方法相比，IceClave 仅引入了 7.6% 的性能开销，同时以最低的硬件成本在 SSD 控制器中实施安全隔离。