ABSTRACT

How do states respond to fatalities of their troops in UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs)? Recent research highlights that participation in peacekeeping is costly for most states. Personnel fatalities should create further costs for contributors and often result in a reduction of their commitments. Studies that evaluate this expectation yield mixed findings. One finds no evidence that OECD countries provide fewer personnel to UN PKOs following fatalities. In contrast, another finds that fatalities generally correspond with reductions in states’ personnel commitments to UN operations in Africa but also reveals that wealthier contributors tend to withdraw at larger magnitudes than their poorer counterparts. This study builds on this work by further hypothesizing that the incentives that motivate states to participate in PKOs condition their willingness to maintain their contributions after experiencing fatalities. An analysis of states’ troop fatalities and commitments to 41 UN operations from 1990 to 2015 supports this expectation. States that are contiguous to an operation, which face greater concerns about the externalities of nearby conflicts, and states that receive side payments for their troop commitments, via foreign aid, are more willing to maintain their commitments in response to fatalities of their troops than other contributors. Additional findings suggest that non-contiguous contributors that do not receive side payments are also inclined to withdraw troops in response to upticks in organized violence surrounding a mission as well as fatalities of other contributors’ troops. These results illustrate that the motives that states face to participate in PKOs also affect their willingness to maintain their troop commitments as their costs for participation increase.

摘要

各国如何应对联合国维和行动 (PKO) 中部队的死亡事件？最近的研究强调，对大多数国家来说，参与维和行动的代价是昂贵的。人员死亡应该给贡献者带来更多的成本，并常常导致他们的承诺减少。评估这一预期的研究得出了不同的结果。没有证据表明经合组织国家在发生死亡事件后向联合国维和行动提供的人员减少。相比之下，另一项研究发现，死亡人数通常与各国对联合国在非洲行动的人员承诺的减少相对应，但也表明，较富裕的捐助者往往比较贫穷的同行更大规模地退出。本研究在这项工作的基础上进一步假设，激励国家参与 PKO 的激励措施会影响他们在经历死亡事件后保持贡献的意愿。对 1990 年至 2015 年各国军队死亡人数和对 41 项联合国行动的承诺的分析支持了这一预期。与某项行动相邻的国家，对附近冲突的外部性面临更大的担忧，以及通过外援为其部队承诺接受附带付款的国家比其他国家更愿意履行承诺以应对其部队的死亡贡献者。其他调查结果表明，没有收到附加费的非连续派遣国也倾向于撤军，以应对围绕任务的有组织暴力事件的增加以及其他派遣国部队的死亡。这些结果表明，随着参与成本的增加，各国参与维和行动的动机也会影响他们维持部队承诺的意愿。