Do states circumvent embargoes by supplying weapons across borders to sanctioned countries? We report evidence that arms imports systematically increase in the neighborhood of conflict states under an embargo. Using several alternative research-design specifications, we contend that this pattern is consistent with arms exporters shifting the arms trade to neighbors of conflict states under sanctions, where it is easier to move arms clandestinely across the border. Despite the lack of direct evidence of clandestine cross-border trafficking, this research contributes to the development of more sophisticated screening tools to identify potential non-compliers with arms embargoes for direct follow-up investigations.

各国是否通过向受制裁国家跨境供应武器来规避禁运？我们报告的证据表明，在禁运下的冲突国家附近，武器进口有系统地增加。使用几种替代的研究设计规范，我们认为这种模式与武器出口商将武器贸易转移到受制裁的冲突国家的邻国是一致的，在那里更容易秘密运输武器越境。尽管缺乏秘密跨境贩运的直接证据，但这项研究有助于开发更复杂的筛选工具，以识别潜在的不遵守武器禁运的人，以进行直接后续调查。