There are plenty of classic paradoxes about conditional obligations, like the duty to be gentle if one is to murder, and about “supererogatory” deeds beyond the call of duty. But little has been said about the intersection of these topics. We develop the first general account of conditional supererogation, with the power to solve familiar puzzles as well as several that we introduce. Our account, moreover, flows from two familiar ideas: that conditionals restrict quantification and that supererogation emerges from a clash between justifying and requiring reasons.

中文翻译：

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超额使用权和有条件义务

关于有条件的义务有很多经典的悖论，比如如果一个人要谋杀，就必须保持温和，以及超出职责范围的“超级”行为。但关于这些主题的交叉点却鲜为人知。我们开发了第一个关于条件超级的一般说明，具有解决熟悉的谜题以及我们介绍的几个谜题的能力。此外，我们的解释源于两个熟悉的想法：条件限制了量化，而超权则源于正当理由和要求理由之间的冲突。