ABSTRACT

The following are purported to be common-sense features of the world: time’s passage, the unreality of the future, the existence of ‘genuine’ change. All of these common-sense features are accommodated by accepting the phenomenon of absolute becoming, a view of temporal passage in which the unreal future comes into existence in the present. Indeed, most philosophers who lay claim to common-sense views of time accept absolute becoming. I argue that absolute becoming has deeply unintuitive consequences. Specifically, proponents of absolute becoming face what I call the coordination problem: in the absence of a connection between the existing present and the unreal future, one must, but cannot, explain how whatever comes into existence preserves the continuing regularity of the world. The standard options to explain the continuing regularity of the world take the form of appealing to enforcers—causation, laws of nature, and dispositions—to guarantee that what comes into existence preserves these regularities. I show that the very nature of a world in which there is no future means that enforcers cannot guarantee this regular nature of the world. Absolute becoming should therefore be rejected: the future does not come into existence; it already exists.

摘要

以下据称是世界的常识性特征：时间的流逝、未来的不现实、“真正”变化的存在。所有这些常识性特征都可以通过接受绝对生成现象来适应，这是一种时间流逝的观点，在这种观点中，不真实的未来在当下出现。事实上，大多数自称对时间有常识性看法的哲学家都接受绝对生成。我认为绝对生成会产生非常不直观的后果。具体来说，绝对生成的支持者面临着我所说的协调问题：在现有的现在和不真实的未来之间没有联系的情况下，人们必须但不能解释任何出现的事物如何保持世界的持续规律性。解释世界持续规律性的标准选项采取诉诸执法者的形式——因果关系、自然法则和倾向——以保证出现的事物保持这些规律性。我表明，没有未来的世界的本质意味着执法者无法保证世界的这种规律性。因此应该拒绝绝对生成：未来不存在；它已经存在。未来不存在；它已经存在。未来不存在；它已经存在。