We study the repeated prisoner’s dilemma with random matching, a canonical model of community enforcement with decentralized information. We assume that (1) with small probability, each player is a “bad type” who never cooperates, (2) players observe and remember their partners’ identities, and (3) each player interacts with others frequently but meets any particular partner infrequently. We show that these assumptions preclude cooperation in the absence of explicit communication but that introducing within-match cheap talk communication restores cooperation. Thus, communication is essential for community enforcement.

中文翻译：

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沟通和社区执法

我们通过随机匹配研究重复的囚徒困境，这是一种具有分散信息的社区执法规范模型。我们假设（1）每个玩家都是一个从不合作的“坏人”的概率很小，（2）玩家观察并记住他们合作伙伴的身份，以及（3）每个玩家经常与他人互动但很少遇到任何特定合作伙伴. 我们表明，这些假设在没有明确交流的情况下排除了合作，但引入比赛内廉价谈话交流可以恢复合作。因此，沟通对于社区执法至关重要。