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Arbitrariness and Uniqueness
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly ( IF 0.7 ) Pub Date : 2021-09-07 , DOI: 10.1111/papq.12384
Christopher J. G. Meacham 1
Affiliation  

Evidential Uniqueness is the thesis that, for any batch of evidence, there's a unique doxastic state that a subject with that evidence should have. One of the most common kinds of objections to views that violate Evidential Uniqueness are arbitrariness objections – objections to the effect that views that do not satisfy Evidential Uniqueness lead to unacceptable arbitrariness. The goal of this paper is to examine a variety of arbitrariness objections that have appeared in the literature, and to assess the extent to which these objections bolster the case for Evidential Uniqueness. After examining a number of different arbitrariness objections, I'll conclude that, by and large, these objections do little to bolster the case for Evidential Uniqueness.

中文翻译:

任意性和唯一性

证据唯一性是这样一种论点,即对于任何一批证据,拥有该证据的受试者都应该具有独特的信念状态。对违反证据唯一性的观点的最常见的反对类型之一是任意性反对——反对不满足证据唯一性的观点导致不可接受的任意性。本文的目的是检查文献中出现的各种任意性反对意见,并评估这些反对意见在多大程度上支持了证据唯一性的案例。在检查了许多不同的任意性反对意见之后,我会得出结论,总的来说,这些反对意见对支持证据唯一性的理由几乎没有作用。
更新日期:2021-09-07
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