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How can constitutional review experiments fail? Lessons from the 1925 Chilean Constitution
International Journal of Constitutional Law ( IF 1.1 ) Pub Date : 2021-07-01 , DOI: 10.1093/icon/moab074
Sergio Verdugo 1
Affiliation  

Constitutional designers establishing a new judicial review mechanism can fail to make that mechanism a relevant instrument for checking the power of incumbent legislators or presidents. Judges may refuse to exercise their newly established powers, politicians may refuse to obey their rulings, or the judiciary may be packed, among other possible reasons. The causes can be attributed to the existence of a dominant party system, the lack of political competition, problems of institutional design, or judicial culture. This article contributes to the understanding of this problem by exploring the failed constitutional mechanism that Chilean constitutional designers established in 1925. The 1925 Chilean Constitution established the power of judicial review of legislation for the first time in Chile’s history, but the Supreme Court generally avoided to be involved in political battles. Chile had a competitive political system with frequent and regular rotation in power. The literature claims that, under these conditions, we should expect judges to be more independent and empowered, but this is not what happened in the Chilean case. Scholars studying this period of Chilean constitutional history generally associate the passivity of the Supreme Court with a legalistic culture promoting an apolitical and formalistic judicial behavior. This article claims that the narrative of judicial apoliticism served to justify, and perhaps to persuade, the Supreme Court’s choice not to intervene in politics, but more attention needs to be given to the institutional weaknesses of the judiciary of that time and to the possible strategic judicial choice.

中文翻译:

宪法审查实验怎么会失败?1925 年智利宪法的教训

建立新的司法审查机制的宪法设计者可能无法使该机制成为检查现任立法者或总统权力的相关工具。法官可能会拒绝行使其新确立的权力,政客可能会拒绝服从他们的裁决,或者司法机构可能会被挤满,以及其他可能的原因。究其原因,可以归结为执政党制度的存在、政治竞争的缺乏、制度设计的问题或司法文化的问题。本文通过探讨智利宪法设计者于 1925 年建立的失败的宪法机制,有助于对这一问题的理解。1925 年智利宪法在智利历史上首次确立了立法的司法审查权,但最高法院一般避免卷入政治斗争。智利有一个竞争激烈的政治制度,权力经常和定期轮换。文献声称,在这种情况下,我们应该期待法官更加独立和更有权力,但智利案件并非如此。研究智利宪法历史这一时期的学者通常将最高法院的被动性与促进非政治和形式主义司法行为的法律文化联系起来。本文声称,司法非政治化的叙述有助于证明,也许是为了说服最高法院不干预政治的选择,但需要更多地关注当时司法机构的制度弱点以及可能的战略司法选择。
更新日期:2021-07-01
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