One classical version of cosmological argument, defended famously by Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus, deduces the existence of a First Cause from the existence of a particular sort of causal series: one that is ‘essentially ordered’. This argument has received renewed defence in recent work by Feser (2013), Cohoe (2013), and Kerr (2015). I agree with these philosophers that the argument is sound. I believe, however, that the standard defence given of the ECA in these philosophers can be complemented by a formulation that appeals to the powers theory of possibility. This approach to possibility has been defended in recent years by, for example, Pruss (2002), Jacobs (2010), and Vetter (2015). In this article, I show how this modal theory allows us to defend the ECA in a way that is dialectically advantageous as well as clarifying.

一个由托马斯·阿奎那和邓斯·斯科特斯著名的宇宙论论证的经典版本，从一种特定类型的因果系列的存在中推断出第一因的存在：一个“本质上是有序的”。在 Feser (2013)、Cohoe (2013) 和 Kerr (2015) 最近的工作中，这一论点得到了新的辩护。我同意这些哲学家的观点，即这个论点是合理的。然而，我相信，这些哲学家对 ECA 的标准辩护可以通过一个诉诸可能性权力理论的表述来补充。近年来，Pruss (2002)、Jacobs (2010) 和 Vetter (2015) 为这种可能性方法辩护。在本文中，我将展示这种模态理论如何使我们能够以一种辩证有利和澄清的方式来捍卫 ECA。