Cooperative federalism is now commonplace in the prosecution of street-level drug and gun crime in the United States. This Article argues that this cooperative federalism presents new—and largely unexplored—constitutional problems. In particular, unlike the civil regulatory context, cooperation threatens the constitutional rights of individual criminal defendants by allowing executives to circumvent local juries, judges, and laws. Moreover, this cooperation also potentially weakens the ability of states to function as political entities that can hold their law enforcement officers accountable in an area of traditional state police power. These problems suggest an important larger project exploring the solutions to these problems of cooperative federalism in criminal law.

中文翻译：

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刑法与合作联邦制

合作联邦制现在在美国起诉街头毒品和枪支犯罪中司空见惯。这篇文章认为，这种合作联邦制提出了新的——而且很大程度上是未经探索的——宪法问题。特别是，与民事监管环境不同，合作允许行政人员规避当地陪审团、法官和法律，从而威胁到个别刑事被告的宪法权利。此外，这种合作还可能削弱国家作为政治实体发挥作用的能力，这些实体可以在传统的国家警察权力领域内追究执法人员的责任。这些问题表明了一个重要的更大的项目，探索解决刑法中合作联邦制这些问题的方法。