This paper analyses the complexity of production, fertilizer-saving level, and emission reduction efforts decisions in a Cournot agricultural products supply chain system. A two-parallel agricultural products supply chain consisting of traditional agricultural producers and green agricultural producers was established. Based on bounded rationality, the decision competition model between the two supply chains was investigated in two scenarios: horizontal Nash (HN) game and long-term Stackelberg (LS) game with traditional agricultural producers as the leader. The Nash equilibrium points of the two models were obtained, and the impact of different decision-making adjustment speeds and critical parameters on the stability of the system and the expected profit of agricultural producers was discussed. The study found that production adjustments had a more significant impact on the stability of the system, decision variables, and expected profits than the adjustment of fertilizer-saving level and emission reduction efforts in the two scenarios. In the HN game, the impact of nitrogen tax or low nitrogen preference on traditional agricultural producers was opposite to that of green agrarian producers. Although the increase of these parameters was beneficial to green agricultural producers, the system’s stability would decrease. In addition, the stability of the LS game model can be divided into two decision-making systems to judge, and the adjustment speed of traditional agricultural producers' decisions had a more significant impact on the whole system. Finally, the feedback control method was used to control the chaos of the system of the HN game.

本文分析了古诺农产品供应链系统中生产的复杂性、化肥水平和减排努力的决策。建立了传统农业生产者和绿色农业生产者两条平行的农产品供应链。基于有限理性，在两个场景下研究了两条供应链之间的决策竞争模型：横向纳什（HN）博弈和以传统农业生产者为主导的长期斯塔克尔伯格（LS）博弈。得到了两种模型的纳什均衡点，讨论了不同决策调整速度和关键参数对系统稳定性和农业生产者预期利润的影响。研究发现，在两种情景下，生产调整对系统稳定性、决策变量和预期利润的影响比节肥水平和减排力度的调整更显着。在HN博弈中，氮税或低氮偏好对传统农业生产者的影响与绿色农业生产者的影响相反。虽然这些参数的增加有利于绿色农业生产者，但系统的稳定性会下降。此外，LS博弈模型的稳定性可以分为两个决策系统进行判断，传统农业生产者决策的调整速度对整个系统的影响更为显着。最后，