Key points

• Doubts remain in EU sustainable finance policy as to the role that the Market in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II) suitability obligation will play in making sure that advisors and portfolio managers adequately service their client’s sustainability preferences. This article tackles this problem by examining the link between ‘sustainability preferences’ and the suitability requirements set forth in Article 25(2) MiFID II. To this end, four versions of draft delegated act (DDA)—issued by the Commission over the 2018–2021 period and aimed at modifying the MiFID II Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565—are analysed and discussed.
• After introducing the MiFID II rules on suitability, the notion of sustainability preferences is defined. Subsequently, a critical analysis is offered as to whether a client’s sustainability preferences should be subsumed into the definition of a client’s ‘investment objectives’ in Article 25(2) MiFID II. Two policies are identified: a policy of ‘alignment’ by which the client’s sustainability preferences constitute investment objectives, and a policy of ‘decoupling’ whereby the definitions of preferences and of investment objectives are bifurcated and deemed to be independent concepts. Although the Commission’s stance has oscillated between these two distinct policies over time, it seems to be the case that the Commission has tilted to the side of alignment in its latest DDA (2021).
• In the last section of the article, the accountability effects of alignment and decoupling are identified and discussed. The policy of decoupling is found to be suboptimal owing to weaker liability incentives by investment firms to adequately treat their clients’ sustainability preferences. Decoupling connotes a more fragile model of investor protection. Conversely, a policy of alignment promotes a more effective enforcement of the MiFID II suitability requirements for the benefit of investors. The discussion presented in this article helps us delineate the MiFID II investor protection standards in sustainable finance policy.

中文翻译：

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欧盟可持续金融中的问责制：将客户的可持续性偏好与 MiFID II 的适用性义务联系起来

关键点

• 关于金融工具市场指令 II (MiFID II) 适当性义务在确保顾问和投资组合经理充分满足其客户的可持续性偏好方面将发挥的作用，欧盟可持续金融政策仍然存在疑问。本文通过检查“可持续性偏好”与 MiFID II 第 25(2) 条规定的适用性要求之间的联系来解决这个问题。为此，对欧盟委员会在 2018-2021 年期间发布的旨在修改 MiFID II 授权法规 (EU) 2017/565 的四个版本的授权法案 (DDA) 草案进行了分析和讨论。
• 在引入 MiFID II 的适用性规则后，可持续性偏好的概念得到了定义。随后，对客户的可持续性偏好是否应纳入 MiFID II 第 25(2) 条中客户“投资目标”的定义进行了批判性分析。确定了两项政策：“一致”政策，通过该政策客户的可持续性偏好构成投资目标，以及“脱钩”政策，即偏好和投资目标的定义被分叉并被视为独立概念。尽管随着时间的推移，委员会的立场在这两种截然不同的政策之间摇摆不定，但似乎委员会在其最新的 DDA（2021 年）中倾向于一致。
• 在本文的最后一部分，确定并讨论了对齐和脱钩的问责效应。由于投资公司在充分对待客户的可持续性偏好方面的责任激励较弱，因此脱钩政策被认为是次优的。脱钩意味着更加脆弱的投资者保护模式。相反，一致的政策促进更有效地执行 MiFID II 适合性要求，以造福投资者。本文中的讨论有助于我们描绘可持续金融政策中的 MiFID II 投资者保护标准。