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Can E-Procurement Reduce Bid Rigging in Public Auctions?
Journal of Competition Law & Economics ( IF 1.3 ) Pub Date : 2021-08-13 , DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhab019
Rieko Ishii

The adoption of e-procurement may reduce bid rigging in public auctions by limiting in-person meetings of bidders. Using the data from construction auctions tendered by a Japanese local government where paper-based manual procurement is replaced by e-procurement, we find that the adoption of e-procurement reduced bids in a section of the market where the bids were initially higher than the other section of the market. The degree of reduction was smaller in an auction when the bidders were likely to be in the same industrial community, suggesting that the effect of e-procurement by limiting in-person meetings is smaller when the bidders have chances to communicate through other than the procurement processes.

中文翻译:

电子采购可以减少公开拍卖中的围标吗?

采用电子采购可以通过限制投标人的面对面会议来减少公开拍卖中的投标操纵。使用日本地方政府招标的建筑拍卖数据,其中纸质人工采购被电子采购取代,我们发现采用电子采购减少了最初出价高于投标的市场部分的出价。市场的其他部分。当投标人可能在同一行业社区时,拍卖中减少的程度较小,这表明当投标人有机会通过采购以外的方式进行交流时,通过限制面对面会议进行电子采购的效果较小过程。
更新日期:2021-08-13
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