SKINNY is a lightweight tweakable block cipher which received a great deal of cryptanalytic attention due to its elegant structure and efficiency. Despite the cryptanalytic efforts the security margins are remaining high. This has led to SKINNY being used as a component of multiple submissions in the NIST Lightweight Competition, an effort to standardize a lightweight AEAD scheme.

Inspired by the SKINNY competitions, multiple attacks on it were reported in different settings (e.g. single vs. related-tweakey) using different techniques (impossible differentials, zero-correlation, meet-in-the-middle, etc.). In this paper we revisit some of these attacks, identify issues with several of them, and offer a series of improved attacks which were experimentally verified. Our best attack can attack up to 18 rounds of SKINNY-64 using 2⁶⁰ chosen plaintexts data, 2¹¹⁶ time, and 2¹¹² memory.

SKINNY是一种轻量级的可调整分组密码，由于其优雅的结构和效率而受到了大量密码分析的关注。尽管进行了密码分析工作，但安全边际仍然很高。这导致SKINNY被用作 NIST 轻量级竞赛中多次提交的组件，这是对轻量级 AEAD 方案进行标准化的努力。

受到SKINNY比赛的启发，在不同的设置（例如单一与相关调整）中使用不同的技术（不可能的差异、零相关、中间相遇等）报告了对其的多次攻击。在本文中，我们重新审视了其中的一些攻击，确定了其中一些攻击的问题，并提供了一系列经过实验验证的改进攻击。我们最好的攻击可以使用 2 ^{60 个}选择的明文数据、2 ¹¹⁶次和 2 ^{112 次}内存攻击多达 18 轮SKINNY -64 。