Cyberattacks on process control systems (PCSs) may target communication links, compromising the data integrity. Cyberattack detection and mitigation are essential capabilities, as the consequences of a successful cyberattack on a PCS may be severe. While detectability may be viewed as a systems-theoretic property, cyberattack detection in practice depends on the attack detection scheme used and the PCS design. This paper presents an approach for control parameter screening based on the detectability of sensor-controller communication link multiplicative attacks. First, a residual set-based condition for the undetectability of an attack is developed. A controller screening methodology aimed at identifying controller parameter choices that mask the detectability of an attack is presented. The proposed methodology can be used to incorporate the detectability of an attack as a criterion into conventional control design criteria (e.g., closed-loop stability and economic considerations). Finally, the application of the controller screening methodology is demonstrated using two illustrative examples.

中文翻译：

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倍增网络攻击下过程的基于可检测性的控制器设计筛选

对过程控制系统 (PCS) 的网络攻击可能以通信链接为目标，从而危及数据完整性。网络攻击检测和缓解是必不可少的功能，因为成功对 PCS 进行网络攻击的后果可能很严重。虽然可检测性可以被视为系统理论属性，但实际上网络攻击检测取决于所使用的攻击检测方案和 PCS 设计。本文提出了一种基于传感器-控制器通信链路乘法攻击的可检测性的控制参数筛选方法。首先，开发了一种基于剩余集的攻击不可检测性条件。提出了一种控制器筛选方法，旨在识别掩盖攻击可检测性的控制器参数选择。所提出的方法可用于将攻击的可检测性作为标准纳入常规控制设计标准（例如，闭环稳定性和经济考虑）。最后，使用两个说明性示例演示了控制器筛选方法的应用。