Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) is one of the most widely adopted clean energy policies in the U.S. However, organized elite power groups, backed by ample political and economic resources, have been known to lead RPS termination efforts. In the context of state renewable energy politics, organized elite power includes legislators affiliated with American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) and anti-renewable energy business groups. Focusing on the roles of organized elite power, this study investigates the drivers of the formulation of RPS rollback (goal freeze) and termination bills, which we refer to collectively as negative policy experimentations. We find that RPS termination attempts are explained by the presence of ALEC legislators and anti-renewable energy business groups, whereas RPS goal freeze bills are better explained by conditions of policy operations. This study contributes to the policy process theory by providing critical insights into the post adoption decisions, including policy termination and rollback legislations, with a focus on the role of organized elite power.

中文翻译：

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有组织的精英电力和清洁能源：对可再生投资组合标准的负面政策实验的研究

可再生能源组合标准 (RPS) 是美国最广泛采用的清洁能源政策之一。然而，众所周知，有组织的精英权力团体在充足的政治和经济资源的支持下领导 RPS 终止工作。在州可再生能源政治的背景下，有组织的精英权力包括隶属于美国立法交流委员会 (ALEC) 的立法者和反可再生能源商业团体。本研究关注有组织的精英权力的作用，调查了制定 RPS 回滚（目标冻结）和终止法案的驱动因素，我们将其统称为负面政策实验。我们发现 RPS 终止尝试可以通过 ALEC 立法者和反可再生能源商业团体的存在来解释，而 RPS 目标冻结法案可以更好地通过政策操作条件来解释。本研究通过提供对采纳后决策（包括政策终止和回滚立法）的批判性见解，为政策过程理论做出了贡献，重点关注有组织的精英权力的作用。