This paper examines how risk-taking is affected by non-compliance with a ‘comply or explain’ based system of corporate governance. Using System Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) estimates to control for various types of endogeneity, the results of this study show that non-compliance with the UK Corporate Governance Code is positively associated with total, systematic, and idiosyncratic risk. However, profitability moderates the impact of non-compliance on firms' risk-taking. The findings of this study further reveal that the impact of non-compliance with various provisions of the UK Corporate Governance Code is not uniform. That is, non-compliance with board independence provisions is associated with higher risk-taking. However, non-compliance with committees' chair independence is associated with lower risk-taking. These findings have implications for investors, policy makers, and corporations regarding the usefulness of compliance with a prescribed code of corporate governance.

本文研究了不遵守基于“不遵守就解释”的公司治理体系如何影响风险承担。使用系统广义矩法 (GMM) 估计来控制各种类型的内生性，本研究的结果表明，不遵守英国公司治理准则与总体、系统和特殊风险呈正相关。然而，盈利能力缓和了不合规对公司风险承担的影响。本研究的结果进一步表明，不遵守英国公司治理守则各项规定的影响并不统一。也就是说，不遵守董事会独立性规定与更高的风险承担相关。然而，不遵守委员会主席独立性与较低的风险承担相关。