Evidence is mixed as to whether less- or more-advantaged fathers suffer penalties for taking paid family leave and the reasons for this. Perhaps selection into taking leave differs among fathers, or taking leave increases some fathers’ commitment to family over paid work, or taking it sends a negative signal to employers about future work-family priorities. We contribute to the literature by distinguishing between the initial paternity leave taken by the majority of fathers, and subsequent solo paternal leave taken by fewer fathers that indicates and signals greater family commitment. We also develop competing hypotheses about why low- or high-wage fathers may be penalized more for taking family leave. These are tested analyzing 2001 to 2014 waves of Finnish administrative panel data using unconditional quantile regression with various fixed-effects models. Net of selection, no fathers incur a sustained wage penalty for taking paternity leave, although distributed fixed-effects models reveal the highest-wage fathers receive a temporary penalty that we attribute to signaling. All fathers who also take solo paternal leave have decreasing post-leave wage trajectories. Only lower-wage fathers accrue significant penalties, however, suggesting that taking the leave shifts their priorities more toward family. We conclude the repercussions of taking shorter or longer family leaves and their sources differ across fathers’ wage distribution.

中文翻译：

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休假对芬兰父亲工资分配的影响

关于较弱或较弱的父亲是否因休带薪家庭假而受到处罚以及造成这种情况的原因，证据参差不齐。也许父亲对休假的选择不同，或者休假增加了一些父亲对家庭的承诺，而不是有偿工作，或者休假向雇主发出了关于未来工作-家庭优先事项的负面信号。我们通过区分大多数父亲最初休的陪产假和随后较少父亲休的单独陪产假来为文献做出贡献，这表明并标志着更大的家庭承诺。我们还提出了相互竞争的假设，即为什么低薪或高薪父亲可能会因休家庭假而受到更多惩罚。使用无条件分位数回归和各种固定效应模型对这些数据进行了测试，分析了 2001 年至 2014 年的芬兰行政面板数据波。剔除选择后，没有父亲因休陪产假而受到持续的工资惩罚，尽管分布式固定效应模型显示工资最高的父亲会受到我们归因于信号的暂时惩罚。所有也休单独育儿假的父亲在休假后的工资轨迹都在下降。然而，只有工资较低的父亲会受到重大处罚，这表明休假会使他们的优先事项更多地转向家庭。我们得出结论，休更短或更长的家事假的影响及其来源因父亲的工资分配而异。尽管分布式固定效应模型显示，工资最高的父亲会受到我们归因于信号的暂时惩罚。所有也休单独育儿假的父亲在休假后的工资轨迹都在下降。然而，只有工资较低的父亲会受到重大处罚，这表明休假会使他们的优先事项更多地转向家庭。我们得出结论，休更短或更长的家事假的影响及其来源因父亲的工资分配而异。尽管分布式固定效应模型显示，工资最高的父亲会受到我们归因于信号的暂时惩罚。所有也休单独育儿假的父亲在休假后的工资轨迹都在下降。然而，只有工资较低的父亲会受到重大处罚，这表明休假会使他们的优先事项更多地转向家庭。我们得出结论，休更短或更长的家事假的影响及其来源因父亲的工资分配而异。