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Stockade: Hardware Hardening for Distributed Trusted Sandboxes
arXiv - CS - Hardware Architecture Pub Date : 2021-08-26 , DOI: arxiv-2108.13922
Joongun Park, Seunghyo Kang, Sanghyeon Lee, Taehoon Kim, Jongse Park, Youngjin Kwon, Jaehyuk Huh

The widening availability of hardware-based trusted execution environments (TEEs) has been accelerating the adaptation of new applications using TEEs. Recent studies showed that a cloud application consists of multiple distributed software modules provided by mutually distrustful parties. The applications use multiple TEEs (enclaves) communicating through software-encrypted memory channels. Such execution model requires bi-directional protection: protecting the rest of the system from the enclave module with sandboxing and protecting the enclave module from a third-part module and operating systems. However, the current TEE model, such as Intel SGX, cannot efficiently represent such distributed sandbox applications. To overcome the lack of hardware supports for sandboxed TEEs, this paper proposes an extended enclave model called Stockade, which supports distributed sandboxes hardened by hardware. Stockade proposes new three key techniques. First, it extends the hardware-based memory isolation in SGX to confine a user software module only within its enclave. Second, it proposes a trusted monitor enclave that filters and validates systems calls from enclaves. Finally, it allows hardware-protected memory sharing between a pair of enclaves for efficient protected communication without software-based encryption. Using an emulated SGX platform with the proposed extensions, this paper shows that distributed sandbox applications can be effectively supported with small changes of SGX hardware.

中文翻译:

Stockade:分布式可信沙箱的硬件加固

基于硬件的可信执行环境 (TEE) 的可用性不断扩大,加速了使用 TEE 的新应用程序的适应。最近的研究表明,一个云应用程序由相互不信任的各方提供的多个分布式软件模块组成。这些应用程序使用多个 TEE(飞地)通过软件加密的内存通道进行通信。这种执行模型需要双向保护:使用沙箱保护系统的其余部分免受飞地模块的影响,并保护飞地模块免受第三方模块和操作系统的影响。但是,当前的 TEE 模型,例如 Intel SGX,无法有效地表示此类分布式沙箱应用程序。为了克服沙盒 TEE 缺乏硬件支持的问题,本文提出了一种名为 Stockade 的扩展飞地模型,它支持由硬件加固的分布式沙箱。Stockade 提出了三个新的关键技术。首先,它扩展了 SGX 中基于硬件的内存隔离,将用户软件模块限制在其飞地内。其次,它提出了一个受信任的监视器 enclave,用于过滤和验证来自 enclave 的系统调用。最后,它允许在一对 enclave 之间共享受硬件保护的内存,以实现高效的受保护通信,而无需基于软件的加密。使用具有建议扩展的模拟 SGX 平台,本文表明分布式沙箱应用程序可以通过对 SGX 硬件的微小更改得到有效支持。它扩展了 SGX 中基于硬件的内存隔离,将用户软件模块限制在其飞地内。其次,它提出了一个受信任的监视器 enclave,用于过滤和验证来自 enclave 的系统调用。最后,它允许在一对 enclave 之间共享硬件保护的内存,以实现高效的受保护通信,而无需基于软件的加密。使用具有建议扩展的模拟 SGX 平台,本文表明分布式沙箱应用程序可以通过对 SGX 硬件的微小更改得到有效支持。它扩展了 SGX 中基于硬件的内存隔离,将用户软件模块限制在其飞地内。其次,它提出了一个受信任的监视器 enclave,用于过滤和验证来自 enclave 的系统调用。最后,它允许在一对 enclave 之间共享受硬件保护的内存,以实现高效的受保护通信,而无需基于软件的加密。使用具有建议扩展的模拟 SGX 平台,本文表明分布式沙箱应用程序可以通过对 SGX 硬件的微小更改得到有效支持。
更新日期:2021-09-01
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