In this paper we focus on some new normativist positions and compare them with traditional ones. In so doing, we claim that if normative judgments are involved in determining whether a condition is a disease only in the sense identified by new normativisms, then disease is normative only in a weak sense, which must be distinguished from the strong sense advocated by traditional normativisms. Specifically, we argue that weak and strong normativity are different to the point that one ‘normativist’ label ceases to be appropriate for the whole range of positions. If values and norms are not explicit components of the concept of disease, but only intervene in other explanatory roles, then the concept of disease is no more value-laden than many other scientific concepts, or even any other scientific concept. We call the newly identified position “value-conscious naturalism” about disease, and point to some of its theoretical and practical advantages.

在本文中，我们关注一些新的规范主义立场，并将它们与传统的立场进行比较。在此过程中，我们主张，如果规范性判断仅在新规范主义所确定的意义上参与确定某种状况是否为疾病，那么疾病仅在弱意义上是规范性的，这必须与传统规范主义所倡导的强意义上的规范性区别开来。规范主义。具体来说，我们认为弱规范性和强规范性的不同之处在于，一个“规范主义”标签不再适合整个立场范围。如果价值观和规范不是疾病概念的明确组成部分，而只是介入其他解释作用，那么疾病概念并不比许多其他科学概念甚至任何其他科学概念更有价值。我们将新确定的立场称为关于疾病的“价值意识自然主义”，并指出其一些理论和实践优势。