The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires firms to use a “suitable framework” as a basis for evaluating the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting. The COSO 1992 framework was the most commonly used suitable framework until it was superseded by the COSO 2013 framework. Because strict compliance with the updated framework was not enforced by regulatory authorities, a nontrivial number of firms did not comply in a timely fashion. We investigate determinants and consequences of noncompliance with the COSO 2013 framework following the supersession of the COSO 1992 framework. We find that noncompliance is positively associated with proxies for resource constraints, financial distress, and a weak internal control environment, and negatively associated with auditor industry specialization, board size, and audit committee accounting expertise. Further tests suggest that following supersession of the 1992 framework, investors view quarterly earnings surprises of the noncompliant firms to be less credible and that noncompliance increases regulatory scrutiny. Finally, we find some evidence that accounting conservatism increases after supersession of the 1992 framework for compliant firms relative to noncompliant firms, suggesting that noncompliance can delay the potential benefits of implementing the updated framework.

美国证券交易委员会 (SEC) 要求公司使用“合适的框架”作为评估财务报告内部控制有效性的基础。COSO 1992 框架是最常用的合适框架，直到被 COSO 2013 框架取代。由于监管机构并未严格遵守更新的框架，因此有相当多的公司没有及时遵守。在 COSO 1992 框架被取代之后，我们调查了不遵守 COSO 2013 框架的决定因素和后果。我们发现不合规与资源限制、财务困境和薄弱的内部控制环境呈正相关，与审计师行业专业化、董事会规模、和审计委员会会计专业知识。进一步的测试表明，在取代 1992 年框架之后，投资者认为不合规公司的季度收益意外不太可信，而且不合规公司会增加监管审查。最后，我们发现一些证据表明，相对于不合规公司，在取代 1992 年合规公司框架后，会计稳健性增加，这表明不合规会延迟实施更新框架的潜在收益。