Recent publications debate the value of inconsistency arguments. Here, I argue that ‘Cause of Death Arguments’ — inconsistency arguments that claim miscarriage causes death far more often than induced abortion — are unsound or invalid. ‘Miscarriage’ ambiguously refers both to intrauterine death, an outcome that does not itself cause death, and preterm delivery, which only sometimes causes death. The referential ambiguity also obscures actions people do take to prevent ‘miscarriage.’ When using the most plausible versions of each premise, these arguments equivocate. Thus, they cannot prove anything. However, missing the equivocation also causes those responding to Cause of Death Arguments to make unconvincing arguments; they inadvertently make or grant false claims themselves. To avoid such mistakes and expose the merely rhetorical power of Cause of Death Arguments, philosophers should replace ‘miscarriage’ with disambiguated terms. Doing so should lead people across the abortion debate to finally abandon the Cause of Death Argument.

最近的出版物争论了不一致论点的价值。在这里，我认为“死亡原因论点”——声称流产导致死亡的频率远高于人工流产的不一致论点——是不合理或无效的。“流产”含糊不清地既指宫内死亡（一种本身不会导致死亡的结果），也指早产（仅有时会导致死亡）。参照的模糊性也掩盖了人们为防止“流产”而采取的行动。当使用每个前提的最合理版本时，这些论点是模棱两可的。因此，他们无法证明任何事情。然而，忽略模棱两可也会导致那些对死因争论做出回应的人提出无法令人信服的论点；他们自己无意中提出或授予虚假声明。为了避免此类错误并暴露死因论证的纯粹修辞力量，哲学家应该用消除歧义的术语代替“流产”。这样做应该会导致人们在堕胎辩论中最终放弃死因争论。