When knowledge sharing is non-contractible, we show that competing downstream firms may prefer to help improve an inefficient alternative supply source than help to improve the technology of the efficient actual supplier—even if this is costless. A downstream firm can have incentives to decrease the efficiency of the actual supplier in order to improve its outside options. Non-controlling partial backward ownership can—through the participation of the downstream firm(s) in the upstream profits—align the incentives of the supplier and its competing customers. This improves industry performance while simultaneously benefiting consumers. Partial backward ownership has similar effects as strengthening a downstream firm’s bargaining power and making knowledge sharing contractible.

当知识共享不可签约时，我们表明竞争的下游公司可能更愿意帮助改进低效的替代供应源，而不是帮助改进有效的实际供应商的技术——即使这是无成本的。下游企业可能有动机降低实际供应商的效率，以改善其外部选择。通过下游公司参与上游利润，非控制性的部分落后所有权可以使供应商与其竞争客户的激励保持一致。这提高了行业绩效，同时使消费者受益。部分落后所有权与加强下游企业的议价能力和使知识共享缩小的效果类似。