Third party litigation financing (TPF)—for-profit, nonrecourse funding of litigation by a nonparty—is a new and rapidly developing industry. As a novel phenomenon that involves various normative concerns, TPF has sparked much debate and controversy among scholars and policy-makers, speculating about its potential effects on issues such as the volume of litigation and the quality of claims filed. We develop a game-theoretic model that compares a litigation process with TPF and a “traditional” scheme in which litigation is self-funded. Under the TPF scheme, we decompose the litigation decisions into two parts: the plaintiff is in charge of the legal decisions, while the TPF has the freedom to decide in each stage of the litigation process whether to continue the financial support in the litigation process. Such a setting is characterized by a high level of uncertainty and a degree of asymmetric information between the plaintiff and the TPF. We argue that the divergent interests of the parties to the financing agreement can be aligned by constructing a viable contract that results in the same equilibrium outcome as litigation with no TPF. The contract that achieves these desired results has a few interesting properties. First, it provides a pre-specified remedy to the plaintiff if the TPF funder terminates the financing prior to the conclusion of the litigation process. Second, the contract also specifies the compensation to the TPF funder, which is due upon completion of the litigation process, and it is conditioned upon the awarded verdict.

第三方诉讼融资 (TPF)——为非当事人的诉讼提供营利性、无追索权的融资——是一个快速发展的新兴行业。作为一种涉及各种规范问题的新现象，TPF引发了学者和政策制定者的大量争论和争议，推测其对诉讼数量和索赔质量等问题的潜在影响。我们开发了一个博弈论模型，将诉讼程序与 TPF 以及诉讼自筹资金的“传统”方案进行比较。在TPF方案下，我们将诉讼决定分解为两部分：原告负责法律决定，而TPF在诉讼过程的每个阶段都可以自由决定是否继续在诉讼过程中提供资金支持。这种设置的特点是高度的不确定性和原告与 TPF 之间的信息不对称程度。我们认为，可以通过构建一个可行的合同来协调融资协议各方的不同利益，该合同产生与没有 TPF 的诉讼相同的均衡结果。实现这些预期结果的合约具有一些有趣的特性。首先，如果 TPF 资助者在诉讼程序结束之前终止融资，它为原告提供了预先指定的补救措施。其次，合同还规定了对 TPF 资助者的补偿，该补偿应在诉讼程序完成后支付，并以裁决结果为条件。我们认为，可以通过构建一个可行的合同来协调融资协议各方的不同利益，该合同产生与没有 TPF 的诉讼相同的均衡结果。实现这些预期结果的合约具有一些有趣的特性。首先，如果 TPF 资助者在诉讼程序结束之前终止融资，它为原告提供了预先指定的补救措施。其次，合同还规定了对 TPF 资助者的补偿，该补偿应在诉讼程序完成后支付，并以裁决结果为条件。我们认为，可以通过构建一个可行的合同来协调融资协议各方的不同利益，该合同产生与没有 TPF 的诉讼相同的均衡结果。实现这些预期结果的合约具有一些有趣的特性。首先，如果 TPF 资助者在诉讼程序结束之前终止融资，则它为原告提供了预先指定的补救措施。其次，合同还规定了对 TPF 资助者的补偿，该补偿应在诉讼程序完成后支付，并以裁决结果为条件。实现这些预期结果的合约具有一些有趣的特性。首先，如果 TPF 资助者在诉讼程序结束之前终止融资，它为原告提供了预先指定的补救措施。其次，合同还规定了对 TPF 资助者的补偿，该补偿应在诉讼程序完成后支付，并以裁决结果为条件。实现这些预期结果的合约具有一些有趣的特性。首先，如果 TPF 资助者在诉讼程序结束之前终止融资，它为原告提供了预先指定的补救措施。其次，合同还规定了对 TPF 资助者的补偿，该补偿应在诉讼程序完成后支付，并以裁决结果为条件。