This paper analyses impression management (IM) during the global financial crisis (GFC). It examines the differences in multiple textual characteristics and attributions between a highly positive performance period (2002–2007) and the GFC period (2008–2012), within the setting of Spain, where these two economic cycles were extreme. In contrast to previous research, companies' extreme poor performance in our sample is driven by an exogenous event. The findings do not show clear evidence of IM based on textual characteristics specifically linked to the GFC. Companies tried not to use overt IM and, to some extent, tried to clarify the impact of the crisis on performance. They were under great scrutiny and probably preferred to tell a more careful story. However, a general pattern of IM was still present during the GFC in the form of consistent positive attributions, favourable benchmarks and enhancement practices. In essence, the crisis did not fully stop IM practices, but rather influenced the way IM was produced. Overall, our results show that IM was lower during the GFC than in the case of poor performance in normal macroeconomic conditions found by previous literature. The results also show that the narratives of firms in the finance and real estate sectors were the most reactive to the GFC, probably linked to their key role in the crisis.

本文分析了全球金融危机 (GFC) 期间的印象管理 (IM)。它研究了在西班牙的环境中，在这两个经济周期都处于极端状态的情况下，表现非常积极的时期（2002-2007 年）和全球金融危机时期（2008-2012 年）之间在多个文本特征和归因方面的差异。与之前的研究相比，我们样本中的公司表现极差是由外生事件驱动的。根据与 GFC 相关的文本特征，研究结果没有显示 IM 的明确证据。公司试图不使用公开的 IM，并且在某种程度上试图澄清危机对绩效的影响。他们受到了严格的审查，可能更愿意讲述一个更仔细的故事。然而，在全球金融危机期间，以一致的积极归因、有利的基准和增强实践的形式，IM 的一般模式仍然存在。从本质上讲，这场危机并没有完全停止 IM 实践，而是影响了 IM 的产生方式。总体而言，我们的结果表明，在 GFC 期间，IM 低于先前文献发现的正常宏观经济条件下表现不佳的情况。结果还表明，金融和房地产行业的公司对全球金融危机的反应最强烈，这可能与它们在危机中的关键作用有关。我们的结果表明，在 GFC 期间，IM 低于先前文献发现的正常宏观经济条件下表现不佳的情况。结果还表明，金融和房地产行业的公司对全球金融危机的反应最强烈，这可能与它们在危机中的关键作用有关。我们的结果表明，在 GFC 期间，IM 低于先前文献发现的正常宏观经济条件下表现不佳的情况。结果还表明，金融和房地产行业的公司对全球金融危机的反应最强烈，这可能与它们在危机中的关键作用有关。