Side-channels are unintended pathways within target systems that leak internal information, exploitable via side-channel attack techniques that extract the target information, compromising the system’s security and privacy. Side-channel attacks are well established within the cybersecurity domain, and thus their cyber-physical systems are actively defended with countermeasures. Non-cyber systems are equally as vulnerable to side-channel attacks; however, this is largely unrecognised and therefore countermeasures to defend them are limited. This paper surveys side-channel attacks against non-cyber systems and investigates the consequent security and privacy ramifications. Side-channel attack techniques rely on respective side-channel properties in order to succeed; therefore, countermeasures that disrupt each side-channel property are identified, effectively thwarting the side-channel attack. This principle is captured within a countermeasure algorithm: a systematic and extensible approach to identifying candidate countermeasures for non-cyber systems. We validate the output of this process by showing how the candidate countermeasures could be applied in the context of each non-cyber system and in the real world. This work provides an extensible platform for translating cybersecurity-derived side-channel attack research into defending systems from non-cyber domains.

旁道是目标系统中的意外路径，会泄漏内部信息，可通过旁道攻击加以利用提取目标信息的技术，危及系统的安全和隐私。侧信道攻击在网络安全领域内已经很成熟，因此他们的网络物理系统可以通过对策积极防御。非网络系统同样容易受到侧信道攻击；然而，这在很大程度上未被承认，因此保护它们的反措施是有限的。本文调查了针对非网络系统的侧信道攻击，并调查了随之而来的安全和隐私后果。侧信道攻击技术依赖于各自的侧信道特性才能成功；因此，确定了破坏每个侧信道属性的对策，有效地阻止了侧信道攻击。这个原则是在对策算法中捕获的：一种系统且可扩展的方法，用于确定非网络系统的候选对策。我们通过展示如何在每个非网络系统和现实世界中应用候选对策来验证此过程的输出。这项工作提供了一个可扩展的平台，用于将网络安全衍生的侧信道攻击研究转化为来自非网络域的防御系统。