ABSTRACT

The main objection to pragmatism about knowledge is that it entails that truth-irrelevant factors can make a difference to knowledge. Blake Roeber [2018. “Anti-Intellectualism.” Mind: A Quarterly Review of Philosophy 127: 437–466] has recently argued that this objection fails. I agree with Roeber. But in this paper, I present another way of thinking about the dispute between purists and pragmatists about knowledge. I do so by formulating a new objection to pragmatism about knowledge. This is that pragmatism about knowledge entails that factors irrelevant to both truth and ‘cognitive agency’ can make a difference to knowledge. An interesting additional upshot of my argument is the connection revealed between the debate between pragmatists and purists about knowledge, and the debate between ‘alethists’ and pragmatists about reasons for belief.

摘要

对知识实用主义的主要反对意见是，它意味着与真理无关的因素可以对知识产生影响。布莱克·罗伯 [2018. “反智主义。” 心灵：哲学季刊127: 437–466] 最近认为这一反对意见不成立。我同意罗伯的观点。但在这篇论文中，我提出了另一种思考纯粹主义者和实用主义者之间关于知识的争论的方式。为此，我对知识的实用主义提出了新的反对意见。这就是关于知识的实用主义意味着与真理和“认知机构”无关的因素可以对知识产生影响。我的论点的一个有趣的附加结果是实用主义者和纯粹主义者之间关于知识的辩论与“alethists”和实用主义者之间关于信仰理由的辩论之间的联系。