The effects of capital requirements on risk-taking and welfare are studied in an overlapping generations model of endogenous growth with banking, limited liability, and government guarantees. Capital producers face a choice between a safe technology and a risky, more productive but socially inefficient, technology. Bank risk-taking is endogenous. As a result of a skin in the game effect—motivated either as an aggregate externality, or as the outcome of the optimal choice of monitoring effort by individual banks—default risk is inversely related to the capital adequacy ratio. Numerical simulations show that in an equilibrium where banks extend both safe and risky loans, the skin in the game effect must be sufficiently strong for a welfare-maximizing regulatory policy to exist. These results remain qualitatively similar with endogenous monitoring costs and a strong effect of monitoring on entrepreneurial moral hazard. However, numerical experiments also suggest that the optimal capital adequacy ratio may be too high in practice and may require concomitantly a broadening of the perimeter of regulation and a strengthening of financial supervision to prevent disintermediation and distortions in financial markets.

资本要求对风险承担和福利的影响是在银行、有限责任和政府担保的内生增长的代际重叠模型中研究的。资本生产者面临着在安全技术和有风险、生产力更高但社会效率低下的技术之间做出选择。银行风险承担是内生的。由于博弈效应的结果——无论是总体外部性，还是个别银行监控努力的最佳选择的结果——违约风险与资本充足率成反比。数值模拟表明，在银行同时提供安全贷款和风险贷款的均衡中，博弈效应的皮肤效应必须足够强，才能实现福利最大化的监管政策的存在。这些结果与内生监控成本和监控对企业家道德风险的强烈影响在质量上仍然相似。然而，数值实验也表明，实践中最优资本充足率可能过高，可能需要同时扩大监管范围和加强金融监管，以防止金融市场的脱媒和扭曲。