ABSTRACT

The idea of a stringent climate club, once the reserve of academic debates, is quickly gaining ground in international policy circles. This reflects dissatisfaction with the multilateral UNFCCC process, but also hope that a minilateral club could increase climate policy ambition, reinvigorate the Paris Agreement process, and make future emissions pledges stick. With the Biden Presidency renewing the US commitment toward climate action and the European Green Deal proposal for carbon border tariffs, some are advocating the creation of a transatlantic climate club. What could a club approach hope to achieve, and what do we know about its political feasibility and desirability? In this article, we seek conceptual clarification by establishing a typology of different club models; we inject a greater sense of political realism into current debates on the feasibility of these models; and we consider their legitimacy in the context of international climate cooperation.

Key policy insights

• Knowledge gaps and confusion regarding the nature of climate clubs hold back debates about what intergovernmental clubs can contribute to international climate policy.

• Club design matters: existing club models vary in terms of the proposed size, purpose, operational principles, legal strength, and relationship to the UNFCCC.

• Clubs focused on normative commitments face low barriers to establishment. They lack legal strength but can help raise policy ambition.

• Clubs aimed at negotiating targets and measures can increase bargaining efficiency, but struggle to deal with equity and distributional conflicts.

• Clubs seeking to change incentives via club benefits and sanctions face the highest hurdles to implementation. Their promise to tackle free-riding remains untested and difficult to achieve.

• Climate clubs face an international legitimacy deficit. Any club proposal needs to consider how to add to, and not distract from, the multilateral climate regime.

摘要

曾经是学术辩论的保留地的严格气候俱乐部的想法正在国际政策界迅速普及。这反映了对多边 UNFCCC 进程的不满，但也希望一个小型俱乐部能够增加气候政策的雄心，重振《巴黎协定》进程，并使未来的排放承诺能够坚持下去。随着拜登总统重申美国对气候行动的承诺和欧洲绿色协议关于碳边界关税的提议，一些人正在倡导建立一个跨大西洋气候俱乐部。俱乐部方法希望实现什么，我们对其政治可行性和可取性了解多少？在本文中，我们通过建立不同俱乐部模型的类型来寻求概念上的澄清；我们在当前关于这些模型可行性的辩论中注入了更大的政治现实主义意识；我们在国际气候合作的背景下考虑它们的合法性。

主要政策见解

• 关于气候俱乐部性质的知识空白和混淆阻碍了关于政府间俱乐部可以为国际气候政策做出哪些贡献的辩论。

• 俱乐部设计很重要：现有俱乐部模式在拟议规模、目的、运营原则、法律效力以及与 UNFCCC 的关系方面各不相同。

• 专注于规范性承诺的俱乐部面临的建立障碍较低。他们缺乏法律力量，但可以帮助提高政策雄心。

• 旨在谈判目标和措施的俱乐部可以提高谈判效率，但难以处理公平和分配冲突。

• 寻求通过俱乐部福利和制裁来改变激励措施的俱乐部面临着最大的实施障碍。他们承诺解决搭便车问题仍未得到检验，也难以实现。

• 气候俱乐部面临国际合法性赤字。任何俱乐部提案都需要考虑如何增加而不是分散多边气候机制。