China's environmentalism with autocratic characteristics has far-reaching effects for fighting air pollution effectively. Political blue sky is unsustainable because conflict of interest in China's authoritarian environmentalism leads to failure of joint prevention and control in air pollution regulations. This study aims to explore policy mechanisms that would integrate intergovernmental join efforts in air pollution control. A non-cooperative tripartite evolutionary game is employed to model the dynamic interactions among the central government, Beijing municipality, and local governments for fighting air pollution. A double-payment with dual-supervision mechanism is proposed for air pollution control in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei (BTH) region. Simulations are conducted to examine the effectiveness of air pollution regulations involving multiple policy instruments for yielding the ideal outcome. It is shown that appropriate coordination of these policy instruments can address the intergovernmental challenge in collective action against air pollution. In addition, two long-term scenarios per the Porter hypothesis are investigated regarding environmental tax reform and enterprise innovations. It is found that such long-term inspirations can improve regulatory flexibility and efficacy. The double-payment with dual-supervision mechanism can effectively engage all governmental stakeholders for promoting sustainable air pollution governance in China. From a methodology perspective, policy simulations in an evolutionary game framework provide a novel addition to the research toolkit for policy studies.