ABSTRACT

The Russian Duma and the Kazakh Mazhilis are typical examples of formally democratic legislatures in authoritarian regimes. This article investigates their role and asks why different authoritarian legislatures have different levels of law-making activity. Neo-institutionalist scholarship argues that legislatures stabilize authoritarian regimes by institutionalizing access to decision-making, but this literature requires further evidence showing which factors stimulate a parliament’s law-making function. The analysis uses an original dataset on 7,564 bills in Russia and Kazakhstan between 2000 and 2016 to explore how different power-sharing arrangements affect the legislative output of both parliaments. The results show that the Duma is much more active in terms of initiating laws and amending executive bills because of its highly differentiated committee system. Nevertheless, both legislatures have become more active after electoral contestedness decreased when United Russia and Nur Otan emerged. This suggests that internal parliamentary organization stimulates law-making activity, whereas electoral contestedness obstructs collective decision-making.

摘要

俄罗斯杜马和哈萨克马日利斯是专制政权中正式民主立法机构的典型例子。本文调查了它们的作用，并询问为什么不同的威权立法机构有不同程度的立法活动。新制度主义学者认为，立法机关通过将决策权制度化来稳定威权政权，但该文献需要进一步的证据来证明哪些因素刺激了议会的立法功能。该分析使用了 2000 年至 2016 年俄罗斯和哈萨克斯坦 7,564 项法案的原始数据集，以探讨不同的权力分享安排如何影响两国议会的立法产出。结果表明，由于其高度分化的委员会制度，杜马在立法和修改行政法案方面更加活跃。尽管如此，在统一俄罗斯党和新山出现后选举竞争减少后，这两个立法机构都变得更加活跃。这表明内部议会组织刺激了立法活动，而选举竞争阻碍了集体决策。