In their rejoinder, Thomas, Pogarsky, Loughran come to the defense of Paternoster (2017) and promise to clarify his position. They also promise to elucidate the logical flaws associated with critiques of Paternoster’s position, reveal the fundamental incompatibility between agency and determinism, and advance the case for a teleological criminology. Although the authors help to clarify some aspects of Paternoster’s position, they ultimately fail to deliver on their promises. In this paper, I clarify my own position, challenge the agency/determinism dualism embraced by Thomas and his colleagues, and highlight additional problems with their approach, which appears to assume the existence of an autonomous and decontextualized willpower. In the end, I highlight the superior utility of a sociocognitive conceptualization of agency, which is rooted in the framework of reciprocal determinism. This conceptualization of agency is appealing for a variety of reasons. It lends itself to a humanistic approach as it provides a guide for human empowerment. When applied to criminological issues, such as desistance from crime, it can inspire new lines of inquiry. But most of all, it is rooted in science and is consistent with a large body of empirical evidence.

在他们的反驳中，Thomas、Pogarsky、Loughran 为 Paternoster (2017) 辩护并承诺澄清他的立场。他们还承诺阐明与对帕特诺斯特立场的批评相关的逻辑缺陷，揭示代理与决定论之间的根本不相容性，并推进目的论犯罪学的案例。尽管作者帮助澄清了帕特诺斯特立场的某些方面，但他们最终未能兑现承诺。在这篇论文中，我阐明了我自己的立场，挑战了 Thomas 和他的同事们所接受的能动性/决定论二元论，并强调了他们方法的其他问题，这些方法似乎假设存在自主和去语境的意志力。最后，我强调了代理的社会认知概念化的优越效用，它植根于相互决定论的框架中。由于各种原因，这种代理的概念化很有吸引力。它适用于人文主义的方法，因为它为人类赋权提供了指南。当应用于犯罪学问题时，例如阻止犯罪，它可以激发新的探究思路。但最重要的是，它植根于科学，并与大量经验证据一致。