We use a business management game to investigate how a pesticide tax and a green nudge affect crop, tillage and pesticide decisions for a virtual farm. Results from German farmers reveal that both policies can reduce pesticide applications. The pesticide tax involves a substantial profit loss. Unlike in the green nudge scenario, participants under pesticide tax adjust their cropping and tillage strategies. We compare farmers’ decisions to those made by a mathematical programming model. Assuming profit maximisation would overestimate farmers’ response to the tax and underestimate the effectiveness of the nudge.

中文翻译：

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税收还是绿色推动？德国农药政策的实验分析

我们使用商业管理游戏来调查农药税和绿色推动如何影响虚拟农场的作物、耕作和农药决策。德国农民的结果表明，这两项政策都可以减少农药的使用。农药税涉及大量利润损失。与绿色轻推情景不同，农药税的参与者调整他们的种植和耕作策略。我们将农民的决策与数学规划模型做出的决策进行比较。假设利润最大化会高估农民对税收的反应，而低估助推的有效性。