Previous research has indicated that constitutionalized emergency provisions effectively constrain the behaviour of democratic governments subsequent to terrorist attacks. In this article, we ask if this is also true for autocratic governments. Are non-democratic governments equally subject to constitutionalized constraints regarding their reactions to emergencies and particularly to terrorist attacks? To answer the question, we analyse the behaviour of a specific group of predominantly autocratic governments that are particularly subject to frequent terrorist incidents, namely the states that are members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. Employing data on terrorist activity from the Global Terrorism Database and constitutional data from the Index of Emergency Powers, we estimate the association between constitutionalized constraints and terrorist attacks in a dataset covering 48 member-states of the organization observed annually between 1970 and 2014. As hypothesized, we find that emergency constitutions that politically make it relatively cheap for governments to declare a state of emergency are more likely to be invoked. In addition, we find that governments are more likely to increase repression after terrorist events when the constitution allocates more discretionary power to the government in emergencies. Our evidence thus suggests that emergency constitutions also impact on the behaviour of largely autocratic governments.

先前的研究表明，宪法化的紧急条款有效地限制了民主政府在恐怖袭击之后的行为。在本文中，我们询问专制政府是否也是如此。非民主政府在应对紧急情况，尤其是对恐怖袭击的反应方面是否同样受到宪法化的限制？为了回答这个问题，我们分析了一个特定的、以专制为主的政府群体的行为，这些政府特别容易受到频繁的恐怖事件的影响，即伊斯兰合作组织成员国的行为。使用来自全球恐怖主义数据库的恐怖主义活动数据和来自紧急权力指数的宪法数据，我们在涵盖 1970 年至 2014 年间每年观察到的该组织 48 个成员国的数据集中估计了宪法化约束与恐怖袭击之间的关联。 正如假设的那样，我们发现紧急宪法在政治上使政府宣布紧急状态的成本相对较低更有可能被调用。此外，我们发现，当宪法在紧急情况下赋予政府更多的自由裁量权时，政府更有可能在恐怖事件发生后加大镇压力度。因此，我们的证据表明，紧急宪法也会影响主要专制政府的行为。我们发现，在政治上使政府宣布紧急状态相对便宜的紧急宪法更有可能被援引。此外，我们发现，当宪法在紧急情况下赋予政府更多的自由裁量权时，政府更有可能在恐怖事件发生后加大镇压力度。因此，我们的证据表明，紧急宪法也会影响主要专制政府的行为。我们发现，在政治上使政府宣布紧急状态相对便宜的紧急宪法更有可能被援引。此外，我们发现，当宪法在紧急情况下赋予政府更多的自由裁量权时，政府更有可能在恐怖事件发生后加大镇压力度。因此，我们的证据表明，紧急宪法也会影响主要专制政府的行为。