This paper models knowledge in cases where an agent has multiple experiences over time. Using this model, we introduce a series of observations that undermine the pretheoretic idea that the evidential significance of experience depends on the extent to which that experience matches the world. On the basis of these observations, we model knowledge in terms of what is likely given the agent’s experience. An agent knows p when p is implied by her epistemic possibilities. A world is epistemically possible when its probability given the agent’s experiences is not significantly lower than the probability of the actual world given that experience.

中文翻译：

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来自多种经验的知识

本文在代理随时间具有多种经验的情况下对知识进行建模。使用这个模型，我们引入了一系列观察，这些观察破坏了经验的证据意义取决于经验与世界的匹配程度的理论前观点。在这些观察的基础上，我们根据给定代理经验的可能性对知识进行建模。当她的认知可能性暗示 p 时，代理就知道 p。当一个世界在给定代理经验的情况下的概率不显着低于给定该经验的实际世界的概率时，这个世界在认知上是可能的。