ABSTRACT

Two principles in epistemology are apparent examples of the close connection between rationality and truth. First, adding a disjunct to what it is rational to believe yields a proposition that’s also rational to believe. Second, what’s likely if believed is rational to believe. While these principles are accepted by many, it turns out that they clash. In light of this clash, we must relinquish the second principle. Reflecting on its rationale, though, reveals that there are two distinct ways to understand the connection between rationality and truth. Rationality is fundamentally a guide to the belief-independent truth, rather than a guide to acquiring true beliefs. And this in turn has important implications for current discussions of permissivism, epistemic reasons, and epistemic consequentialism.

摘要

认识论中的两个原则是理性与真理之间密切联系的明显例子。首先，将析取符添加到合理相信会产生一个同样合理相信的命题。其次，相信的可能性是合理的相信。虽然这些原则被许多人接受，但事实证明它们存在冲突。鉴于这种冲突，我们必须放弃第二个原则。然而，反思其基本原理表明，有两种不同的方式可以理解理性与真理之间的联系。理性从根本上说是通往独立于信念的真理的指南，而不是获得真信念的指南。这反过来又对当前关于宽容主义、认知原因和认知后果论的讨论具有重要意义。