In this paper, we investigate social preferences in network games, where the network structure determines whose action affects the payoff of which player. We develop alternative theories that incorporate inequality aversion and welfare preference into the context of dominant-strategy network games, and test their implications in laboratory experiments. When the economic return is relatively low, we observe that subjects contribute more than the amount that would maximize their monetary profit; moreover, subjects at the central network positions contribute more than those at the periphery. These anomalies suggest that subject behavior is mainly driven by the welfare preference and not as much by either inequality aversion or self-interest, regardless of the network structures considered. In a supplemental experiment with an increased economic return, we find that the advantage of social preferences over self-interest in driving individual activities varies with the underlying network architecture. We also estimate the behavioral parameters and interpret the results in relation to the network topology.

在本文中，我们研究了网络游戏中的社交偏好，其中网络结构决定了谁的行为会影响哪个玩家的收益。我们开发了替代理论，将不平等厌恶和福利偏好纳入主导策略网络游戏的背景中，并在实验室实验中测试它们的影响。当经济回报相对较低时，我们观察到受试者的贡献大于使他们的货币利润最大化的金额；此外，处于网络中心位置的主体比处于边缘的主体贡献更多。这些异常表明，无论考虑何种网络结构，主体行为主要是由福利偏好驱动的，而不是由不平等厌恶或自身利益驱动的。在一项增加经济回报的补充实验中，我们发现社会偏好在推动个人活动方面优于自身利益的优势因底层网络架构而异。我们还估计行为参数并解释与网络拓扑相关的结果。