Periodic inspections, in which firms are punished for detected violations, are a popular means of enforcing environmental, health, and safety regulations. The effectiveness of these programs typically hinges on inspection timing being unannounced and difficult to anticipate, lest firms comply only when they believe inspections are likely. In Las Vegas, Nevada, many facilities—e.g., casinos, hotels, and shopping malls—house multiple food-service establishments, several of which are often inspected during the same inspector visit. When this happens, all but the first establishment inspected likely anticipate their inspection to a meaningful extent. Using data which record inspection starting times and span more than six years, I find that establishments in such facilities perform significantly and substantially worse when they receive the first inspection of a visit. Relative to their own performances when inspected later than first, establishments are assessed 21% more inspection-score demerits and cited for 31% more critical violations in these surprise inspections.

定期检查是强制执行环境、健康和安全法规的常用手段，其中公司因发现的违规行为而受到惩罚。这些计划的有效性通常取决于检查时间的不确定性和难以预测，以免公司仅在他们认为可能进行检查时才遵守。在内华达州的拉斯维加斯，许多设施（例如，赌场、酒店和购物中心）设有多个餐饮服务场所，在同一检查员访问期间经常检查其中几个。发生这种情况时，除了第一家接受检查的企业外，所有企业都可能在有意义的程度上预期他们的检查。使用记录检查开始时间和跨度超过六年的数据，我发现这些设施中的企业在接受访问的第一次检查时表现明显更差。相对于他们自己在比第一次检查晚时的表现，在这些突击检查中，企业被评估的检查分数记过多 21%，被引用的严重违规行为多 31%。