This article uses a history of concept formation focused on Pierre Bourdieu’s probabilism to provide the groundwork for a probabilistic sociology. We argue that not only was Bourdieu a probabilist, but that reframing probability along heterodox lines holds empirical promise when it is also linked to new concept formation, as evident in the case of Bourdieu. For the anglophone sociological field, probability is of primary significance for method and epistemic commitment. Sociological theory continues to react to the integral role of probability used for the purposes of sociological knowledge but finds very little in the way of concept formation that does not adopt the same commitments as the methodologists. The history we outline retrieves a different approach, one which finds Bourdieu aligned with objective probability borrowed from the sociology of Max Weber. This version of probabilism locates probability directly in the world and makes it a source of concept formation without the intervention of the methodologists. This article follows Bourdieu as he recognizes objective probability in the work of Weber (around 1973) and then engages in novel concept formation on these grounds. Ranging between spaces of objective probability (fields), spaces of randomness (games of chance), and spaces of determinism (apparatus), Bourdieu’s mature probabilism reveals the conceptual and meta-methodological differences that come with making probability objective. Probabilistic expectations derive from the world itself, rather than existing as part of explanation or method. Specifically, this history of concept formation reveals a looping relation between objective probability (chances) and learned probability (expectations) that, as Bourdieu himself appreciated, holds wide-ranging implications for best knowledge practices and empirical sociological research.

本文使用专注于皮埃尔·布迪厄概率论的概念形成史为概率社会学提供基础。我们认为，布迪厄不仅是一个概率论者，而且当它也与新概念的形成相关联时，沿着异端路线重新构建概率也具有经验上的前景，正如布迪厄的案例所证明的那样。对于英语社会学领域，概率对于方法和认知承诺具有主要意义。社会学理论继续对用于社会学知识目的的概率的整体作用做出反应，但在概念形成的方式中几乎没有发现与方法论者不同的承诺。我们概述的历史检索了一种不同的方法，该方法发现布尔迪厄与客观概率一致借用马克斯·韦伯的社会学。这个版本的概率论直接在世界中定位概率，并使其成为概念形成的来源，而无需方法论者的干预。本文跟随布迪厄，他在韦伯（1973 年左右）的工作中认识到客观概率，然后在这些基础上进行新的概念形成。在客观概率空间（场）、随机空间（机会游戏）和决定论空间（装置）之间，布迪厄成熟的概率论揭示了使概率客观化所带来的概念和元方法论差异。概率预期源自世界本身，而不是作为解释或方法的一部分而存在。具体来说，