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Efficient supervision strategy for illegal dumping of construction and demolition waste: A networked game theory decision-making model
Waste Management & Research ( IF 3.9 ) Pub Date : 2021-08-19 , DOI: 10.1177/0734242x211032031
Chenyu Liu 1 , Chunxiang Hua 2 , Jianguo Chen 1
Affiliation  

While the construction industry has brought substantial economic benefits to society, it has also generated substantial construction and demolition waste (CDW). Illegal dumping, which refers to dumping CDW in an unauthorized non-filling location, has become widespread in many countries and regions. Illegally dumping CDW destroys the environment, causing groundwater pollution and forest fires and causing significant economic impacts. However, there is a lack of research on the decision-making behaviours and logical rules of the main participants, construction contractors and the government in the illegal CDW dumping process. This paper constructs an evolutionary game model on a small-world network considering government supervision to portray the decision-making behaviours of illegal dumping participants and conducts a numerical simulation based on empirical equations to propose an effective supervision strategy for the government to manage illegal CDW dumping efficiently. It is found that the illegal dumping behaviours of contractors are mainly affected by the intensity of government supervision, the cost of fines and the income of illegal dumping; while for government, a supervision strategy is found to be necessary, and a supervision intensity of approximately 0.7 is the optimal supervision probability given supervision efficiency. Notably, under a low-level supervision probability, increasing the penalty alone does not curb illegal dumping, and a certain degree of supervision must be maintained. The results show that in addition to setting fines for illegal dumping, the government must enforce a certain level of supervision and purify the market environment to steadily reduce illegal dumping.



中文翻译:

非法倾倒建筑垃圾的高效监管策略:网络博弈论决策模型

建筑业在为社会带来可观经济效益的同时,也产生了大量的拆建垃圾(CDW)。非法倾倒是指将CDW倾倒在未经授权的非填充地点,在许多国家和地区已经普遍存在。非法倾倒 CDW 会破坏环境,造成地下水污染和森林火灾,并造成重大经济影响。但是,对主要参与方、施工方和政府在非法倾倒废车过程中的决策行为和逻辑规律的研究还很缺乏。本文在考虑政府监管的小世界网络上构建演化博弈模型来刻画非法倾销参与者的决策行为,并基于经验方程进行数值模拟,提出政府管理非法倾销车辆的有效监管策略。有效率的。发现承包商的非法倾倒行为主要受政府监管力度、罚款成本和非法倾倒收入的影响;而对于政府来说,发现监管策略是必要的,在给定监管效率的情况下,监管强度约为 0.7 是最优监管概率。值得注意的是,在低监管概率下,仅增加处罚并不能遏制非法倾销,并且必须保持一定程度的监督。结果表明,除了对非法倾销进行罚款外,政府还必须加强一定程度的监管,净化市场环境,稳步减少非法倾销。

更新日期:2021-08-19
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